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Interbank markets are often characterised in terms of a core-periphery network struc-
ture, with a highly interconnected core of banks holding the market together, and a
periphery of banks connected mostly to the core but not internally. This paradigm has
recently been challenged for short time scales, where interbank markets seem better
characterised by a bipartite structure with more core-periphery connections than inside
the core. Using a novel core-periphery detection method on the eMID interbank market,
we enrich this picture by showing that the network is actually characterised by multiple
core-periphery pairs. Moreover, a transition from core-periphery to bipartite structures
occurs by shortening the temporal scale of data aggregation. We further show how the
global financial crisis transformed the market, in terms of composition, multiplicity and
internal organisation of core-periphery pairs. By unveiling such a fine-grained organ-
isation and transformation of the interbank market, our method can find important
applications in the understanding of how distress can propagate over financial networks.
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Key messages
• We study the eMID interbank market using a novel core-periphery detection method to unveil its high-order
network organization.
• We reveal multiple core-periphery pairs, and detect both tiered and bow-tie (bipartite) structures.
• We reveal a topological transition of the market at the global financial crisis, in terms of network segregation
and organization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial turmoils of the last decade highlighted the inherent fragility of the financial system arising from the
complex interconnections between financial institutions (see, e.g., Battiston et al. (2016); Gai et al. (2011); Glasserman
and Young (2015)). Several contributions have shown that systemic risk can result both from direct exposures to
bilateral contracts and from indirect exposures to common assets (Acemoglu et al., 2015; Allen and Gale, 2000; Amini
et al., 2016; Bardoscia et al., 2015, 2017; Battiston et al., 2012; Caccioli et al., 2014; Chan-Lau et al., 2009; Cifuentes
et al., 2005; Cimini and Serri, 2016; Cont et al., 2013; Cont and Wagalath, 2016; Elsinger et al., 2006; Furfine, 2003;
Gai and Kapadia, 2010; Georg, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2015; Gualdi et al., 2016; Haldane and May, 2011; Kaufman,
1994). Much research has thus been carried out by academics and regulators to characterise the emerging network
structure of financial markets (Boss et al., 2004; Cocco et al., 2009; Iori et al., 2006; Nier et al., 2007). A parallel
line of research consisted in developing methods to reconstruct the network structure from available data—usually,
the balance sheet composition of financial institutions, since data on individual exposures are often privacy-protected
(see Anand et al. (2015); Cimini et al. (2015a,b); Di Gangi et al. (2015); Gandy and Veraart (2016); Squartini et al.
(2017) among the most recent contributions, and Anand et al. (2017) for a comparison of most of these methods).
In this context, much attention has been devoted to studying the interbank lending market, namely the network of
financial interconnections between banks resulting from unsecured overnight loans (Freixas et al., 2000; Rochet and
Tirole, 1996) (see Hu¨ser (2015) for a recent overview of the field). Within this market, banks temporarily short on
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2liquidity borrow money for a specified term from other banks having excess liquidity, that in turn receive an interest
on the loan. Thus this market plays a crucial role by allowing banks cope with liquidity fluctuations (Allen et al.,
2014). However, the interbank market is rather sensitive to market movements, and it can dry up under exceptional
circumstances (Brunnermeier, 2009)—becoming a main vehicle for distress propagation within the financial system
(Acharya and Merrouche, 2013; Angelini et al., 2011; Berrospide, 2013). Indeed, during the 2007/2008 global financial
crisis, worries of counterparty creditworthiness and fire sales spillovers led banks to hoard liquidity, causing the freeze
of credit to the financial system and the real economy (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Gale and
Yorulmazer, 2013; Krause and Giansante, 2012; Serri et al., 2017).
Because of its structure, the interbank market can be represented as a network, where interbank loans constitute
the direct exposures between banks (De Masi et al., 2006; Iori et al., 2015; Leo´n and Berndsen, 2014). Finger et al.
(2013) analysed the network properties of the electronic market for interbank deposits (eMID) at various temporal
scales of data aggregation, showing that the network appears random at the daily level, but contains significant
non-random structures for longer aggregation periods. Several empirical studies further reported that interbank
markets have a core-periphery (or tiered) structure, featuring a core of highly interconnected banks and a periphery of
banks connected mostly to the core but not to other peripheral banks (Bech and Atalay, 2010; Craig and Von Peter,
2014; Fricke and Lux, 2015; Iori et al., 2008; Langfield et al., 2014; Martinez-Jaramillo et al., 2014; Silva et al.,
2016; Sorama¨ki et al., 2007; Veld and van Lelyveld, 2014). Craig and Von Peter (2014) argued that tiering derives
from core banks acting as intermediaries between periphery banks and thus holding together the interbank market.
Unfortunately, according to Lee (2013) core-periphery structures with a deficit money centre bank do give rise to the
highest level of systemic liquidity shortage. In fact Fricke and Lux (2015) showed that, during the global financial
crisis, the reduction in interbank market size was mainly due to core banks reducing their lending. Verma et al.
(2016) explained the emergence of core-periphery using an economic argument based on trade-offs between the profit
of establishing connections and the cost for maintaining them.
Recently, Barucca and Lillo (2016, 2018) used a stochastic block-modelling approach to show that the core-periphery
structure of eMID emerges only when data are aggregated for more than a week. They also showed that, for shorter
aggregation periods, the network is instead better characterised by a bipartite (or bow-tie) structure, with connections
established mainly between core and periphery banks. This means that for short time scales banks in eMID either
lend or borrow—a rather different situation than a market where core banks intermediate between peripheral banks.
Bipartitivity emerges even at longer aggregation periods when using an extended stochastic block model that takes
into account the different numbers of connections that different banks have. Carren˜o and Cifuentes (2017) also used
stochastic block models to analyse the interbank market of term deposits and derivatives in Chile at the daily level.
Their approach permits to identify multiple cores and peripheries—though they rarely observed a second core—and
allows to characterise different forms of interaction between core and periphery. Remarkably, they often found a core
mostly funding itself from the periphery, rather than intermediating among peripheral banks.
In this work we add to the current discussion by employing a novel methodology able to reveal multiple core-
periphery pairs in a network, automatically determining their number and size (Kojaku and Masuda, 2017). Focusing
on eMID, we show that the market actually features a main core-periphery pair mostly composed of Italian banks,
a second smaller core-periphery pair of foreign banks, and many other smaller core-periphery pairs. The method
also detects bipartite patterns for long (i.e., quarterly and monthly) as well as short (i.e., weekly and daily) data
aggregation periods, which is consistent with what Barucca and Lillo (2016) found. By analysing the temporal
evolution of the detected multiple core-periphery structures, we observe that the global financial crisis caused a
considerable change in the core-periphery patterns of the network, for all the quantities we observed. Note that
we compare these results with those found by well-known core-periphery detection methods: the Borgatti-Everett
algorithm (Borgatti and Everett, 2000) and MINRES (Boyd et al., 2010; Lip, 2011). These methods turn out to fail
in detecting both core-periphery multiplicity and bipartitivity, as well as many structural changes of the network due
to the crisis.
II. METHODS
A. eMID data
The electronic Market for Interbank Deposits (eMID) is the first electronic market for interbank deposits established
in the Euro area. Founded in Italy in 1990 for Italian Lira transactions, it was denominated in Euros in 1999, and to
3FIG. 1 Schematic illustration of three types of core-periphery structure. The filled (black) and empty (blank) cells indicate the
presence and absence of connections, respectively. The solid squares delimit core-periphery pairs, and the dashed lines mark
the boundaries between core and periphery.
date currencies traded are Euros, USD and GBP.1 The market is subject to the supervision of the Bank of Italy, and
is open to both Italian and foreign banks. eMID covers the whole domestic liquidity deposit market in Italy, as well
as a significant share of the entire liquidity deposit market in the Euro area (Beaupain and Durre´, 2008).
Our dataset contains all interbank transactions finalised on eMID from January 1999 to September 2012. Each
transaction record contains the IDs of the lender and the borrower banks, the amount of credit transferred and the
time of the transaction. These interbank loans constitute the bilateral exposures between banks, and the system can
be conveniently described as a network.
Let N be the number of banks in the system. We fix a time period of length t, and define the network at t
through the N × N binary adjacency matrix A(t) = {Aij(t)}Ni,j=1. We set Aij(t) = 1 if banks i and j perform a
trade on eMID at least once during t (and say that these banks are adjacent), and Aij(t) = 0 otherwise. To ease the
analysis, we ignore edge directions, so that the network matrices are symmetrical. We regard a bank as active at t
if it established at least one connection during the corresponding time period, and inactive otherwise. We construct
quarterly, monthly, weekly and daily networks by setting the length of the time period to a quarter, a month, a week
and a day, respectively. We also construct a “static” network by setting t equal to the entire time span of the dataset.
B. Core-periphery structure
As outlined in Figure 1, a core-periphery structure based on the density of connections is composed of at least
a pair of core and periphery blocks. The core block (in the upper left corner of Figs. 1(a) and (b)) has many
intra-block connections, whereas, the peripheral block (in the bottom right corner) has relatively few intra-block
connections. Connections between core and periphery blocks (in the upper right and bottom left corners) may be
abundant (Fig. 1(a)) or not (Fig. 1(b)). Networks may consist of a single core-periphery pair (Figs. 1(a) and (b)) or
of multiple core-periphery pairs (Fig. 1(c)).
C. Core-periphery detection
In order to detect core-periphery structures we use the Borgatti-Everett (BE) (Borgatti and Everett, 2000), MINRES
(Boyd et al., 2010; Lip, 2011) and the Kojaku-Masuda (KM–ER) (Kojaku and Masuda, 2017) algorithms. In the
following descriptions of the algorithms, we omit the time label t to simplify the notation, recalling that all methods
take as input a given adjacency matrix A(t).
In the BE algorithm, one considers an idealised single core-periphery pair, in which each core node is adjacent to
all core and peripheral nodes, and each peripheral node is not adjacent to any other peripheral nodes. The adjacency
1 A collateralised segment of e-MID (New MIC) was introduced in February 2009.
4matrix for the idealised single core-periphery pair is given by BBE = {BBEij }Ni,j=1, with
BBEij ≡
{
1 (xi = 1 or xj = 1),
0 (xi = xj = 0),
(1)
where xi = 1 or 0 if node i is a core node or a peripheral node, respectively, and i 6= j. The BE algorithm seeks
x = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ] by maximising the similarity between B
BE and the adjacency matrix A of the given network. The
MINRES algorithm also seeks x by maximising the similarity between BBE and A, however ignoring the contribution
from connections between the core and the periphery. As such, MINRES allows the core and periphery blocks to
be sparsely connected (Fig. 1(b)). Note that both BE and MINRES algorithms identify only one pair of core and
periphery in a given network.
The KM–ER algorithm instead allows multiple core-periphery pairs (Fig. 1(c)). KM–ER considers a network
composed of C non-overlapping idealised core-periphery pairs, in which there is no connection between differ-
ent core-periphery pairs. The adjacency matrix for the idealised core-periphery structure is given by BKM–ER =
{BKM–ERij }Ni,j=1, with
BKM–ERij ≡
{
δ(ci, cj) (xi = 1 or xj = 1),
0 (xi = xj = 0),
(2)
where ci is the index of the core-periphery pair to which node i belongs, δ(·, ·) is Kronecker’s delta, and i 6= j. The
KM–ER algorithm seeks x and c = [c1, c2, . . . , cN ] by maximising
Qcp ≡
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
AijB
KM–ER
ij −
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
ρ (A)BKM–ERij
=
N∑
i=1
i−1∑
j=1
(Aij − ρ (A)) (xi + xj − xixj)δ(ci, cj), (3)
where ρ (A) is the overall density of the network:
ρ (A) ≡
∑N
i=1
∑i−1
j=1Aij
1
2N(N − 1)
. (4)
In eq. (3), the term
∑N
i=1
∑i−1
j=1AijB
KM–ER
ij accounts for the number of connections that appear in both A and
BKM–ER, whereas, the term
∑N
i=1
∑i−1
j=1 ρ(A)B
KM–ER
ij represents the number of edges for the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random
graph that has the same number of edges as the given network. A large Qcp value indicates that the given network
has strong core-periphery structure as compared to the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph.
To maximise Qcp, the KM–ER algorithm proceeds as follows (Kojaku and Masuda, 2017). First, we assign each
node to a different core, i.e., xi = 1 and ci = i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Then, we reassign the label ci to each node i in a random
order as follows. For node i, we tentatively assign it to the core of the core-periphery pair to which a neighbour j
belongs, i.e., we set xi = 1 and ci = cj . Then, we tentatively assign node i to the periphery of the core-periphery
pair, i.e., we set xi = 0 and ci = cj . We repeat this procedure for each neighbour j of node i and adopt the tentative
label—(cj , 0) or (cj , 1)—that yields the largest increment in Q
cp. If no relabelling increases Qcp, no update of (ci, xi)
is done. After sweeping all nodes, we end the relabelling procedure if we have not changed any label in the current
sweep. Otherwise, we sweep all nodes again in a new random order and repeat the procedure. We run this algorithm
ten times starting from the same initial labels (i.e., xi = 1 and ci = i) and adopt the result giving the largest Q
cp
value.
1. Significance of a core-periphery pair
In order to estimate the significance of the detected core-periphery pairs, we use the statistical method described in
Boyd et al. (2006); Kojaku and Masuda (2017). Suppose a single core-periphery pair, described by x = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ],
is detected by an algorithm—say BE. First, we compute the quality of the core-periphery pair as
q(x;A) =
∑N
i=1
∑i−1
j=1 [Aij − ρ (A)]
[
BBEij − ρ
(
BBE
)]√∑N
i=1
∑i−1
j=1 [Aij − ρ (A)]2
√∑N
i=1
∑i−1
j=1
[
BBEij − ρ (BBE)
]2 . (5)
5TABLE I Properties of core-periphery pairs in the static network. The index k labels the core-periphery pair.
k N
[k]
C (t) N
[k]
P (t) ρ
[k]
CC(t) ρ
[k]
CP(t) ρ
[k]
PP(t)
BE 1 74 276 0.98 0.50 0.11
MINRES 1 122 228 0.92 0.31 0.06
KM–ER
1 118 107 0.91 0.57 0.13
2 28 20 0.68 0.51 0.12
3 1 3 0 1 0
4 1 2 0 1 0
Second, we generate 103 randomized Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks, each with the same number of nodes and edges of
the original network; for each randomised network A˜, we detect a single core-periphery pair x˜ using BE, and compute
its quality q(x˜; A˜). Finally, we deem that the original core-periphery pair is significant if it has a larger quality
than a fraction 1 − α of the single core-periphery pairs detected in the randomised networks, where α ∈ [0, 1] is the
significance level. If instead there are multiple core-periphery pairs detected, we apply the aforementioned statistical
test to each of them. We suppress the false positives owing to multiple comparisons using the Sˇida´k correction (Sˇida´k,
1967), i.e., α = 1− (1− α′)1/C , where α′ = 0.05 is the targeted significance level. In the following, we refer to banks
belonging to insignificant core-periphery pairs as residual banks.
2. Characterisation of a core-periphery pair
We use the density of connections to quantitatively characterise each block of a core-periphery pair. For the k-th
core-periphery pair, i.e., including nodes with c = k, we define ρ
[k]
CC , ρ
[k]
CP and ρ
[k]
PP as the fraction of edges within
the core block, that between the core and periphery blocks, and that within the periphery block, respectively. These
quantities are given by:
ρ
[k]
CC ≡
∑N
i=1
∑i−1
j=1Aijxixjδ(ci, k)δ(cj , k)
1
2N
[k]
C (N
[k]
C − 1)
, (6)
ρ
[k]
PP ≡
∑N
i=1
∑i−1
j=1Aij(1− xi)(1− xj)δ(ci, k)δ(cj , k)
1
2N
[k]
C (N
[k]
P − 1)
, (7)
ρ
[k]
CP ≡
∑N
i=1
∑i−1
j=1Aij(xi + xj − 2xixj)δ(ci, k)δ(cj , k)
N
[k]
C N
[k]
P
, (8)
where N
[k]
C =
∑N
i=1 xiδ(ci, k) and N
[k]
P =
∑N
i=1(1 − xi)δ(ci, k) are the number of nodes of the core and periphery in
the kth core-periphery pair, respectively.
III. RESULTS
A. Static network
We start by analysing the static network, which is obtained by setting t equal to the entire time span of the dataset.
By definition, the BE and MINRES algorithms identify a single core-periphery pair (Figs. 2(a) and 2(b)). In contrast,
the KM–ER algorithm identifies four core-periphery pairs (Fig. 2(c)). In this case, the largest and second largest
core-periphery pairs mostly consist of Italian and foreign banks, respectively. Thus, the KM–ER algorithm discerns
the network behaviour of Italian and foreign banks in an unsupervised way, which is consistent with previous studies
(Fricke and Lux, 2015).
Table I reports values of connection density for the core-periphery blocks detected by the three algorithms. In all
cases, except for star structure with only one core node, core-periphery pairs satisfy ρ
[k]
CC(t) > ρ
[k]
CP(t) > ρ(t) = 0.28 >
ρ
[k]
PP(t), where ρ(t) is the overall density of the network. This means that the core-periphery characterisation of the
network is rather marked for such a long aggregation period.
6FIG. 2 Core-periphery pairs detected by the various algorithms. Colour labels on rows/columns indicates Italian (green) and
foreign (blue) banks.
B. Temporal network
We now move to the analysis of temporal networks, in which t is set equal to either a quarter, a month, a week and
a day. Figure 3 shows how core-periphery structures detected by the three algorithms change over time, in the case
of quarterly networks (refer to Figs. A.7–A.9 for the case of monthly networks).2 We see that the KM–ER algorithm
detects, almost always, a significantly large core-periphery pair (which we will refer to as main core-periphery pair),
accompanied by a few small core-periphery pairs. These small pairs are very short-lived, as they persist for only
a few quarters. Remarkably, the number of small core-periphery pairs increases until the beginning of the global
financial crisis, and then starts decreasing. Thus, the crisis event marks a tipping point in the tiered organisation of
the interbank market. Additionally, the size of the main periphery decreases in time, indicating that main peripheral
banks had an increasing tendency to move to small core-periphery pairs (or to become residual). Note also that,
similarly to the static network case, for temporal networks the main core-periphery pair detected by the KM–ER
algorithm mainly consists of Italian banks (Fig. 4). The second largest pair consists mainly of foreign banks, but this
feature emerges only between 2002 and 2009 and for data aggregation periods that are not too short.
To further inspect the effect of the crisis on eMID, we compute the Jaccard’s coefficient for the bank composition
of the main core at each pair of time points t and t′, i.e., |C[1](t) ∩ C[1](t′)|/|C[1](t) ∪ C[1](t′)|, where C[1](t) is the set
of core nodes of the main core-periphery pair at time t. The Jaccard index is large if the cores at times t and t′ have
many banks in common, and small otherwise. As shown in Figure 5, the main cores detected by all three algorithms
experience an abrupt change around 2002 (supposedly after the dot.com bubble burst) and especially in 2008, in the
midst of the global financial crisis.
We conclude our analysis by studying the internal structure of the main core-periphery pairs detected by the three
algorithms. To this end, we compute the fraction of edges (i.e., the edge density) within the core, that between the
core and periphery, and that within the periphery in the main core-periphery pair. Figure 6 shows the density the
of different types of edges within the main core-periphery pairs. In most cases, we observe a marked decay in the
density of intra-core edges after 2008, leading to a higher segregation of the network. Concerning the specifics of the
algorithms, BE and MINRES always return a “standard” core-periphery structure, namely ρ
[1]
CC(t) > ρ
[1]
CP(t) > ρ
[1]
PP(t)
(the less clear case of BE on daily networks will be discussed shortly). The KM–ER algorithm instead returns a more
composite picture. For long aggregation periods (i.e., quarterly and monthly), a standard core-periphery structure
is detected only before the crisis. Afterwards, we observe ρ
[1]
CP(t) > ρ
[1]
CC(t): connections between core and periphery
become more abundant than those within the core. This is a signature of bipartitivity, and again the structural
transition happens during the crisis. For short aggregation periods (weekly and daily), bipartitivity is detected in the
majority of cases, in accordance with the findings of Barucca and Lillo (2018).
Finally, focusing on daily networks (which are the noisiest due to the scarcity of connections), bipartite-like struc-
tures are detected by the BE, MINRES and KM–ER algorithms in approximately 27%, 2% and 59% of the cases,
respectively.
2 Shorter time scales cannot be properly shown with these kinds of plots, but their properties will be as well analysed in the following.
7FIG. 3 Core-periphery structures in quarterly temporal networks detected by the three algorithms. Each rectangle indicates
either a core, a periphery or the residual, as indicated by letters “c”, “p” and “r”, respectively. Darker and lighter hue of the
same colour indicate a core and the corresponding periphery, respectively. Different colours (e.g., red, blue, green) indicate
different core-periphery pairs, while grey marks the residual nodes. The width of each rectangle represents the size (i.e., number
of nodes) for each block. The flow between the rectangles in consecutive time points (i.e., the shaded region) indicates the
number of banks that move from one group to another. Inactive banks at each quarter are not shown.
8FIG. 4 Fraction of Italian and foreign banks in the largest and second largest core-periphery pairs detected by the KM–ER
algorithm.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this work we employed the KM–ER algorithm (Kojaku and Masuda, 2017) to characterise the internal organisa-
tion of the electronic market for interbank deposit eMID. As compared to other core-periphery detection algorithms,
the KM–ER method stands out by identifying multiple core-periphery pairs allowing, for instance, to discern Italian
and foreign banks in an unsupervised way. Note that although KM–ER is designed to detect core-periphery struc-
tures, the method has also been able to reveal the bipartite-like organisation of the market. This result is consistent
with previous studies (Barucca and Lillo, 2016, 2018), in which bipartite-like structures in the eMID network were
detected using stochastic block-modelling and its degree-corrected version (Karrer and Newman, 2011). In partic-
9FIG. 5 Jaccard index for the composition of the main core (quarterly networks).
ular, using standard stochastic block-modelling Barucca and Lillo (2016, 2018) found a single core-periphery pair
which turned into a bipartite structure for short data aggregation periods, whereas, using degree-corrected stochastic
block-modelling bipartitivity emerged also for longer periods. Here we found bipartite-like blocks in the networks
by allowing multiple core-periphery pairs without discounting the effect of nodes’ degree, and yet we detected bi-
partitivity for long data aggregation periods as well. Concerning the temporal evolution of the market, the KM–ER
algorithm revealed a structural transition during the global financial crisis, both in terms of network segregation and
organisation: the multiplicity of core-periphery pairs disappeared, and the main core-periphery structure was replaced
by a bipartite-like structure.
Clearly, the network patterns revealed by any algorithm-based analysis do depend on how the algorithm is designed.
It would be useful to perform, in the future, an extensive comparison of the results obtained by both core-periphery
and block-model based methods, in order to reveal the market features which are invariant from the observation lens
used in the analysis.
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